A Pennsylvania employer cannot be sued for blocking an employee from suing the third party responsible for her workplace injury, the state’s high court has ruled in reversing two lower courts.
In a case involving an employee who was bitten at work by a customer’s dog and then prevented by the employer from suing the dog owner, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has issued a strong endorsement of the exclusive remedy provision of the state’s Workers Compensation Act and refused to recognize an exception to that doctrine that shields employers from lawsuits related to job injuries.
In the 6-0 opinion written by Justice David Wecht, the high court stated that while the result may be unfair, it is not the court’s place to “subvert legislative intent based upon the outcome or equities of any one case.”
Lindsay Franczyk did not seek to recover from Home Depot for the dog bite itself; she accepted workers’ compensation payments for her injury and related surgery. But she sued her employer for the economic harm she suffered when she lost the opportunity to file a third-party claim against the dog owner.
Franczyk reported the bite promptly to her supervisors, who investigated the incident, but barred Franczyk from having any further contact or interaction with the dog owner or any witnesses. Home Depot questioned two individuals who separately had brought dogs into the store, and also spoke to an eyewitness, but ultimately allowed all of them to leave the store without taking any identifying or contact information.
Home Depot contended that, because Franczyk’s injury occurred in the course of her employment, the WCA barred her claim notwithstanding any failure on its part to act more diligently in securing the information she needed to bring a third-party claim.
The high court granted Home Depot summary judgment, agreeing with the retailer that the WCA’s exclusivity protected it from being sued because the harm of not being able to sue was “intertwined inextricably” with the workplace injury.
According to the high court, the WCA’s linchpin is its “exclusivity provision,” which provides that the liability of any employer shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to employees.
The court noted that over the long history of the WCA, courts have recognized only a few narrow exceptions to this exclusivity. It cited a few examples of possible exceptions involving intentional harm and fraudulent misrepresentation by employers in some states. But in almost all situations in Pennsylvania where there is a workplace injury, matters must be settled within the workers’ compensation system.
Two lower courts denied Home Depot summary judgment and ruled instead that Franczyk’s lawsuit could proceed. The lower courts agreed that the WCA exclusivity is not absolute.
The trial court found that Home Depot could not fail to obtain any identifying information from the third party, and then turn around and tell the employee that her only other remedy in this case is against that third party who she has no way to identify.
The Superior Court concluded that Home Depot was estopped from seeking WCA protection because its acts “effectively stripped” Franczyk of her ability to file a claim against the third-party dog owner, as contemplated by the legislature.
But the Supreme Court rejected what it called this “novel” exception to WCA’s exclusivity. “The exception proffered by the lower courts cannot be reconciled with the Act’s design, purpose, or plain language,” Justice Wecht wrote.
The court offered its view of what is often called the “grand bargain” of workers’ compensation:
“The exclusivity clause of the WCA reflects the historical quid pro quo between an employer and an employee whereby the employer assumes liability without fault for a work-related injury but is relieved of the possibility of a larger damages verdict in a common law action. The employee benefits from the expeditious payment of compensation but forgoes recovery of some elements of damages. The comprehensive system of substantive, procedural, and remedial laws comprising the workers’ compensation system should be the exclusive forum for redress of injuries in any way related to the work place.”
The court acknowledged that while the WCA generally precludes employees from bringing workplace injury claims against their employers, it preserves the employees’ rights to bring negligence claims against third parties who bear some responsibility for employee injuries. It further noted that when an employee recovers on such a claim, the employer may seek “subrogation,” recouping its workers’ compensation expenses up to the amount recovered from the third party.
Franzyck argued that an employer has a public duty to assist an employee in exercising its right to sue the third party, but the court warned that imposing such a burden could lead to precisely the sort of litigation the WCA seeks to avoid, because once an employer’s “reasonableness” becomes a factor determinative of liability, a trial likely follows.
Franczyk also argued that her claim against Home Depot was based upon an injury distinct from her workplace injury itself. But the court found that the asserted injury was “intertwined” inextricably with the workplace injury. Here the court cited a prior opinion that held that WCA exclusivity barred a lawsuit that sought relief for an insurer’s bad faith in settlement negotiations, which allegedly so adversely affected the employee’s psychological health that he attempted to take his own life. Even though the tortious acts occurred after the workplace injury and thus stated a distinct harm, those acts and the consequent injury were “completely intertwined with the original injury, the court noted.
In closing, the justices offered that the court is not responsible for what might seem an unfair resolution:
“If the result in this case is not entirely equitable for Franczyk, that is an unavoidable incident of the balance that the General Assembly struck. It is in the nature of global policy compromises that, in any given case, either party may receive more or less than what equity alone might call for. The General Assembly made a calculated if generalized judgment about the public interest writ large, and it is not our place to subvert legislative intent based upon the outcome or equities of any one case.”
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