Uber Avoids Liability for Driver’s Assault on Passenger

Uber Technologies “is not an insurer” and so when one of its drivers assaults a rider, the ride-hailing company is “not automatically liable,” a federal judge in Philadelphia wrote in dismissing claims against Uber brought by a passenger who was attacked.

Antonio Matos suffered serious injuries when he was attacked by Uber driver Darryl Holloway Jr. when Holloway came to pick him up at Philadelphia International Airport.

Judge Karen Marston of the federal district court in Philadelphia found that Matos twice failed to show that Uber should have known the driver might be violent and thus should be held liable.

On the afternoon of July 8, 2022, Holloway, responding to an app request from Matos for a ride, was having trouble locating Matos at the agreed-up location at the airport. During the delay, Matos twice asked if he could cancel the ride, which Holloway asked him not to do. Matos finally showed about 30 minutes after Matos had requested the ride. Once there, Holloway exited his car and said to Matos, “Do you have something else to f***ing say to me?” When Matos did not respond, Holloway said, “I thought so…” and hurled a slur for gay men at Matos. Then Holloway began to attack Matos, punching him in the head and shoving him. After the attack, Holloway drove away before police arrived.

Matos sued, alleging that he suffered physical and emotional injuries from this attack. He brought claims for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision against Uber.

In June 2024, the court dismissed with prejudice his claims for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Uber. But the judge dismissed without prejudice his claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision, giving Matos another chance to make his case.

The judge pointed out the deficiencies Matos would need to overcome to prevail. She explained that Matos needed to provide “factual allegations that Holloway had committed similar prior bad acts before joining Uber” or that Uber “otherwise knew or should have known that Holloway had violent tendencies before enrolling him as a driver.” A continued failure to meet this burden would doom both his negligent hiring and negligent supervision claims.

As for his negligent training claim, the judge advised Matos that he had to show why Uber had a “duty to train Holloway on an issue as elementary as not assaulting passengers or that training on something this basic would have prevented the assault.”

In July 2024, Matos filed an amended complaint. However, this week the judge said the revised complaint “was nearly identical” to his original one and she determined that Matos had not cured the deficiencies in his claims. She granted Uber’s motion to dismiss them all.

According to Judge Marsten, in the second complaint Matos appeared to assert a respondeat superior claim against Uber. Under this doctrine, an employer can be held responsible for the actions of an employee if those actions occurred while the employee was working.

The judge found that Matos could not rely on respondeat superior because under Pennsylvania law, an employer can be held vicariously liable only for the tortious acts of an employee “done in the course of his employment, and within the general scope of his authority.” The judge concluded that how Holloway conducted himself was “so excessive and dangerous, as to be totally without responsibility or reason under the circumstances” and thus respondeat superior liability did not attach.

To state a claim for negligent hiring, a plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should have known of the violent propensities of the employee and hired the person anyway, thus exposing a plaintiff like Matos to danger. According to the judge, the amended complaint still lacked factual allegations suggesting that Holloway had committed similar bad acts prior to joining Uber or that Uber knew or should have known that Holloway had violent tendencies before enrolling him as a driver. The updated complaint alleged only that Holloway had committed traffic violations and may have been involved in two accident lawsuits‚ acts which the court said would not have put Uber on notice of Holloway’s propensity to injure others.

Matos offered only “conclusory allegations” that Holloway had a history of violence or that Uber knew or should have known that Holloway was homophobic, violent, and had a bad temper. Plus, the allegations about Uber’s screening process were insufficient because a “more thorough screening process would not have uncovered signs of violent behavior.”

The negligent supervision claim also failed because Matos did not show that Uber knew or should have known of a need to supervise Holloway. As with his negligent hiring claim, Matos was unable to point to some prior bad acts by Holloway that “would have put a reasonable employer on notice of his propensity to injure others.”

Last, the court found that Matos had not stated a claim for negligent training, which requires a showing that the defendant had a duty to train its employees on the particular topic at issue, breached that duty, and the breach caused the plaintiff’s harm. Matos offered numerous “conclusory allegations” about why Uber was negligent in its training but he still had not shown that Uber had a duty to train Holloway on “something as elementary as not assaulting passengers.” Matos also did not identify what training Uber does provide and why that training might be insufficient.

In sum, the court said it identified issues in Matos’ complaint and gave him a chance to fix them but he did not do so. Thus, his negligent hiring, supervision, and training claims all failed and were dismissed with prejudice.

Topics Liability Personal Auto Sharing Economy Ridesharing